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Establishing Climate Change Standing:  
A New Approach 
 
IAN R. CURRY* 
 
Climate change is one of the thorniest political, legal, and eco-
nomic issues of our time. Therefore, a new legal approach to the is-
sue is required. This Note proposes a streamlined approach for cli-
mate change standing, one that assumes injury in fact and 
causation for a class of discernible climate change harms. A stream-
lined approach will enable litigants harmed by climate change to 
seek redress in court, providing an outlet for redress where there 
has previously been none. Part II of this Note discusses the consti-
tutional doctrine of standing. It begins with a summary of Article 
III and the logic behind the case or controversy requirement, it then 
goes on to analyze each element of standing, (1) injury in fact, (2) 
causation, and (3) redressability. Part III analyzes the doctrine of 
standing in environmental cases, discussing notable cases such as 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Juliana v. United States. Part 
IV compares the American approach to judicial standing to other 
countries with more liberalized standing requirements, such as the 
 
*  J.D., summa cum laude, Advanced Certificate in Environmental Law, Produc-
tions Editor, PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Elisabeth Haub School of 
Law at Pace University, Class of 2019; B.A. in Political Science/History, 
summa cum laude, with a minor in Environmental Business and Economics, 
Rutgers University, Class of 2016. The Author would like to thank his family 
for their continual optimism and support, particularly his Mom for spurring 
his interest in environmental issues with her significant environmental activ-
ism in the local community. The Author would also like to thank his girlfriend 
for supporting and encouraging the Author on a daily basis throughout law 
school. The Author would also like to thank the environmental law faculty at 
Pace, especially Professor Katrina Kuh, who provided invaluable feedback and 
edits, and Professor Karl Coplan, for challenging and inspiring the Author and 
countless other environmental law students in courses such as Environmental 
Skills, Environmental Survey, and the Environmental Litigation Clinic. 
Lastly, the Author would also like to thank the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
REVIEW Editors and Associates for their hard work and input on this Note. 
1
   
298 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 36 
Philippines. Part V argues for a new, streamlined approach for cli-
mate change standing. This Note concludes with the hypothesis that 
establishing standing using the three-part test is largely an aca-
demic exercise, one with illogical constraints that can be overcome 
with simple fixes (such as the purchase of a plane ticket) and that a 
new, streamlined approach for climate change standing, should be 
adopted. A new, streamlined approach to standing, which assumes 
injury in fact and causation for a specific class of climate change 
injuries, will enable the American judicial system to effectively re-
dress climate change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution created the jurisdictional lim-
its of the American judicial system. These limits were primarily 
articulated in broad terms, such as restricting justiciable claims to 
“cases” or “controversies.” Among other doctrines, standing is used 
to discard seemingly meritless cases in which the parties seeking 
judicial resolution have not sufficiently plead an injury, or the in-
jury is one which cannot be redressed by a court. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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Although the doctrine of standing was drafted with the inten-
tion to the articulate the scope of the judicial system, it shifted an 
extremely high burden to a procedural stage in litigation proceed-
ings. Standing requires that several elements be satisfied, such as 
causation, an element that is typically developed much further on 
in litigation. In environmental cases, plaintiffs bear this high bur-
den at a preliminary stage. 
This Note discusses the constitutional doctrine of standing as 
it pertains to climate change cases.1 Part II begins with a summary 
of Article III and the logic behind the case or controversy require-
ment. Part III discusses the major environmental decisions on 
standing in the United States. Part IV compares the standing re-
quirements in other countries to the American approach. Part V of 
this Note discusses the waning importance of judge-made decisions 
in environmental standing. Finally, Part VI of this Note concludes 
with the hypothesis that establishing standing using the three-
part test is largely an academic exercise, one with illogical con-
straints that can be overcome with simple fixes (such as the pur-
chase of a plane ticket), and that a new, streamlined approach for 
climate change standing should be adopted. A new, streamlined 
approach to standing that assumes injury in fact and causation for 
a specific class of climate change injuries will enable the American 
judicial system to effectively redress climate change and focus on 
the implementation of solutions. 
II. CASE OR CONTROVERSY? 
The United States Constitution was drafted with numerous 
safeguards to maintain checks and balances, and to ensure effi-
cient governance. One of these efficiency measures is Article III’s 
case or controversy requirement.2 The framers of the Constitution 
 
1. There are many ways to define “climate change cases,” but this Note does 
not purport to answer that question. Just as with any piece of legislation and even 
the Constitution, words are often ambiguous. Judges will need to define that term, 
and the accepted injuries that accompany it, using whatever means necessary. 
The ambiguous nature of the term “climate change” does not detract from the 
need of this new streamlined approach nor in any way hinder its potential effec-
tiveness. As the new streamlined approach is applied, judges will form the bound-
aries from which litigants will adjust accordingly. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
3
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restricted the Supreme Court to hear bona fide “cases” or “contro-
versies.”3 The vagueness of the Article III requirement spawned a 
plethora of litigation to articulate a precise definition of “cases” or 
“controversies.”4 The resulting judicial interpretations of this 
clause veered far from the original terms. The Supreme Court elu-
cidated a strict, three-part test to satisfy this requirement. The test 
requires an injury in fact, causation, and redressability.5 Each re-
quirement “must persist at every stage of review, or else the action 
becomes moot.”6 This test tends to favor economic injuries because 
they are easily discernible as injuries in fact.7 Nonetheless, the 
American judicial system was not created to administer justice 
solely for economic injuries, but social and political injuries as 
well.8 In such cases against another branch of government, the Su-
preme Court rigorously conducts the standing inquiry.9 
The doctrine of standing is rooted in sound logic. Scarce judi-
cial resources are reserved for litigants with an actual stake in the 
 
3. Id. 
4. Over the past sixty years, the case law on standing developed and changed 
significantly. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Simon 
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
5. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations omitted). 
6. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 179 (2000) [hereinafter Friends of the Earth II]. 
7. See generally Camp, 397 U.S. at 152 (even a potential “future loss of prof-
its” may satisfy an injury in fact for Article III purposes). The potential for future 
environmental damage is not viewed on par with future economic losses, despite 
strong similarities. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (the future or “some day intentions” of 
the plaintiffs to visit an area that may face environmental damage was insuffi-
cient to establish an injury in fact). 
8. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013) (holding the De-
fense of Marriage Act defining marriage as between a man and a woman violates 
the due process clause); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
322 (2010) (holding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 barring 
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violates 
the First Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 347 
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding segregated public schools violates the equal protec-
tion clause). 
9. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (quoting Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)) (“‘[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially 
rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether 
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controversy.10 Additionally, litigants with an actual stake in the 
case will be more effective in their advocacy because they face the 
consequences of a decision.11 There is a fear that without such a 
restriction, the judiciary would interfere in areas typically re-
served for the executive or legislative branch.12 As a result, stand-
ing works for well-defined, individualized injuries.13 However, in-
juries and harms on a much larger, worldwide scale, such as 
climate change, do not fit within the historical justification of 
standing.14 
For the most part, the Supreme Court bends the doctrine of 
standing to address sensitive political and social issues,15 except 
with regards to the environment.16 Environmental issues are not 
easily attributable to one source and the cross-boundary nature of 
climate change makes it difficult to address.17 Further, it can be 
 
10. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. 
Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)) (“A federal court cannot ‘pro-
nounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States, void, because irrec-
oncilable with the constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal 
rights of litigants in actual controversies.’”).  
11. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 
(1988) (“The stated purposes and black-letter doctrine of standing are numbingly 
familiar. The purposes include ensuring that litigants are truly adverse and 
therefore likely to present the case effectively, ensuring that the people most di-
rectly concerned are able to litigate the questions at issue, ensuring that a con-
crete case informs the court of the consequences of its decisions, and preventing 
the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making functions 
of the popularly elected branches.”). 
12. Id. 
13. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate “a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy”).  
14. “This state of affairs makes federal court an ill-fitting venue for any en-
vironmental groups or private citizens seeking to litigate a cause of action for cli-
mate change-related injuries.” Niran Somasundaram, Note, State Court Solu-
tions: Finding Standing for Private Climate Change Plaintiffs in the Wake of 
Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 491, 493 (2015) 
(discussing the constraining doctrine of standing for environmental plaintiffs af-
ter the decision in Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
15. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616–24 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(finding the State of Texas had standing to challenge the Deferred Action for Par-
ents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program because the pro-
gram would permit a significant number of undocumented immigrants in Texas 
to apply for citizenship, which would cause a financial strain on state resources).  
16. See infra Parts II–III. 
17. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (“IPCC”), Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report, in IPCC FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 6 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/XQ2V-7BMW (“In recent decades, changes in climate have 
5
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difficult to show a concrete injury directly resulting from environ-
mental degradation. 
Climate change, one of the most omnipotent threats of our 
time, is not one issue that needs one solution. Rather, climate 
change requires sweeping societal, cultural, and political solutions 
that address nearly every aspect of modern civilization. The Indus-
trial Revolution is generally regarded by scientists as the pivotal 
moment when humans began on the track to runaway carbon emis-
sions.18 Since that time, nearly every industry19 and every person 
in developed countries have contributed to increased greenhouse 
gas emissions in some form or another.20 Therefore, climate change 
involves solving an issue in which we all share responsibility. Forc-
ing climate change cases into the confines of the historical Article 
III standing shows a clear misunderstanding of the larger issue at 
hand—that those actors who contributed to the harm may be hard 
to identify, and causation may be hard to prove. The doctrine of 
standing is not suited to handle an issue of this magnitude. As a 
result, the American judicial system is ill-equipped to contribute to 
the reduction or mitigation of the effects of climate change because 
of judge-made constraints imposed under the guise of the constitu-
tional standing requirement. Nonetheless, that does not mean a 
new judicial doctrine cannot attempt to remedy environmental 
harms. 
 
caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the 
oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, in-
dicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate.”). 
18. IPCC, Working Group 1: The Scientific Basis, App’x 1 – Glossary, in 
SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 (2018), https://perma.cc/2X2S-34CU 
(noting the Industrial Revolution marks the beginning of a strong increase in the 
use of fossil fuels); see Climate Change Indicators: Atmospheric Concentrations of 
Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/S72W-TFUV 
(“Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased substantially since the beginning 
of the industrial era, rising from an annual average of 280 [parts per million] in 
the late 1700s to 401 [parts per million] as measured at Mauna Loa in 2015—a 
43 percent increase.”). 
19. The major sectors contributing to the increase of GHGs are electricity, 
transportation, industry, commercial/residential, agriculture, and land use/for-
estry. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/WH6B-K3KY. 
20. Developed countries, and by association its citizens, are the largest con-
tributors of GHGs. See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/H6R9-HEX7. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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A. Injury in Fact 
The first requirement in the three-part standing test is injury 
in fact. The actual phrase, “injury in fact,” is not found in the Con-
stitution.21 This requirement evolved from Baker v. Carr, in which 
the Supreme Court stated standing is established if “such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy” is presented.22 Sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases, discussed below, expanded the judi-
cial requirements beyond this brief phrase. The language of the 
first requirement originated in Association of Data Processing Ser-
vice Organizations v. Camp.23 Petitioners, the Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, sought review of the Comptrol-
ler’s ruling that allowed banks to offer competing data services.24 
Petitioners argued the ruling violated the Bank Service Corpora-
tion Act of 1962.25 The Supreme Court held petitioners suffered an 
“injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”26 The Court found potential 
future losses, and the potential loss of two customers, sufficient to 
satisfy injury in fact.27 Other than this brief analysis on injury in 
fact, the Court offered no guidance or direction on how to apply the 
injury in fact requirement to later cases.28 
Only two years later, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme 
Court was faced with the issue of whether a noneconomic injury 
may satisfy the injury in fact requirement.29 The Court held in the 
affirmative, stating noneconomic aesthetic damages may consti-
tute an injury in fact, but only if “the party seeking review [is] . . . 
among the injured.”30 Sierra Club did not satisfy this requirement 
because it “failed to allege that it or its members would be affected 
 
21. See Cassandra Barnum, Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never 
Again): Summers v. Earth Island Institute and the Need for Change in Environ-
mental Standing Law, 17 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
22. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
23. See Camp, 397 U.S. at 150. 
24. Id. at 151. 
25. Id. at 155 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (2018)). 
26. Id. at 152. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. (there was a lack of conversation throughout the entire case re-
garding the application of the injury in fact requirement). 
29. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. 
30. Id. at 735. 
7
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in any of their activities or pastimes by the [proposed] develop-
ment.”31 
Further, in Morton, the Supreme Court alluded to the fact that 
an injury in fact must be a “particular, concrete injury.”32 The 
Court applied that requirement in Warth v. Seldin.33 The Warth 
Court dismissed the case because plaintiffs failed to establish 
standing.34 The Court stated “[a]bsent the necessary allegations of 
demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence of 
‘a real need to exercise the power of judicial review’ or that relief 
can be framed ‘no (broader) than required by the precise facts to 
which the court’s ruling would be applied.’”35 
Injury in fact was then further refined in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife.36 Justice Scalia stated the injury had to be “concrete 
and particularized,”37 not “conjectural or hypothetical.”38 In only a 
few years, the doctrine of standing evolved from requiring “a per-
sonal stake in the outcome”39 to an injury in fact that is “concrete 
and particularized . . . actual or imminent, [not] conjectural or hy-
pothetical.”40 Thus, these decisions have increased the burden that 
environmental plaintiffs must meet to establish standing. 
B. Causation 
Requiring causation ensures that defendants may only be held 
liable for actions which they “caused.” There are two main types of 
causation: proximate cause and cause in fact. Proximate cause ex-
ists where there is a causal connection between the act and harm 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 740 n.16 (“[J]udicial review is effective largely because it is not 
available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to rem-
edy a particular, concrete injury.”). 
33. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
34. Id. at 518–19.  
35. Id. at 508 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 221–22 (1974)). 
36. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555. 
37. Id. at 560. 
38. Id. (citations omitted). 
 39. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
40. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
  
2019] Establishing Climate Change Standing 305 
that is not “too remote.”41 Cause in fact, or actual cause, typically 
uses the “but for” test; “but for” the defendant’s conduct, the plain-
tiff’s injury would not have occurred.42 The causation required in a 
standing analysis is most akin to cause in fact, but the requirement 
is not entirely identical to either proximate cause or cause in fact. 
The first reference to causation in the doctrine of standing oc-
curred in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion.43 The Supreme Court held the plaintiffs, an organization that 
represented indigents who were denied hospital care, could not 
prove the defendants, which were officials at the Department of 
Treasury, caused the plaintiff’s injuries.44 After finding an injury 
in fact, the Supreme Court concluded: 
 
 [T]he “case or controversy” limitation of Art. III . . . requires 
that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury 
that results from the independent action of some third party 
not before the court.45  
 
Here, the Court determined that the Treasury officials were too far 
removed from the plaintiff’s injuries to have caused them. 
Certain jurisdictions recognize the hurdle of causation im-
posed upon environmental litigants.46 For example, in Natural Re-
source Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, a case 
from the Central District of California, the barriers to establish 
 
41. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 
(2014) (“[T]he proximate-cause requirement generally bars suits for alleged harm 
that is ‘too remote’ from the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”). 
42. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (“[Cause in fact or 
actual cause] means the former event caused the latter.”); see Burrage v. United 
States, 571 U.S. 204, 211 (2014). 
43. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 43. 
44. Id. at 42–43.  
45. Id. at 41–42 (emphasis added). 
46. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals accords significant deference to Con-
gressional findings of causation. See Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 31 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (“[W]e must give great weight to this congressional finding [of causa-
tion] in our standing inquiry.”); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps,  561 F.2d 1002, 
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (causation is shown because the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act “established as a matter of law the requisite causal relationship between 
American importing practices and South African sealing practices.”). 
9
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causation were lowered.47 The court held plaintiffs established 
causation since “causation is sufficiently established by the con-
gressional findings that prompted passage of the Clean Water 
Act.”48 Due to the variation among jurisdictions in determining 
causation, the requirements to establish this element are not en-
tirely clear. Causation, which is historically often difficult to dis-
cern in common law tort cases,49 is just, if not more, confusing for 
environmental plaintiffs. 
C. Redressability 
The third standing requirement, “‘[r]edressability,’. . . does not 
appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution. Instead, it is a 
judicial creation[.]”50 This requirement seeks to ensure that a judi-
cial remedy will directly “redress” the injury in fact caused by the 
defendant.51 Litigants are not required to prove a favorable deci-
sion will fully redress the issue to a high degree of certainty.52 Ra-
ther, once causation and injury in fact are established, it must be 
shown that the injury is “likely to be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion.”53 The requirement of redressability ensures that scarce ju-
dicial resources are reserved for cases in which a judicial remedy 
effectively redresses the alleged injury. 
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment refined the 
requirement of redressability.54 Citizens for a Better Environment 
(“CBE”) sent a notice of intent to file a citizen suit under the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”)55 
alleging Steel Company had not filed the statutorily required haz-
ardous waste forms.56 CBE used the information published under 
 
47. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1147 
(C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting environmental plaintiffs did not need to establish causa-
tion with certainty to establish standing). 
48. Id.  
49. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 692–93 (2011). 
50. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 124 (1998) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). 
51. Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (“the indirectness of the injury . . . may make it 
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III.”). 
52. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). 
53. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38 (emphasis added). 
54. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107–10. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (2018). 
56. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 83. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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EPCRA for various purposes, such as the publication of  “reports 
to its members and the public about storage and releases of toxic 
chemicals into the environment[.]”57 CBE’s members then used 
this information to protect their “safety, health, recreational, eco-
nomic, aesthetic and environmental interests[.]”58 Despite these 
facts, the Supreme Court did not determine whether an injury in 
fact was present, but instead jumped to the third requirement, re-
dressability, in dismissing the case.59 
After receiving the notice, Steel Company filed the overdue 
forms.60 On certiorari, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, con-
cluding CBE failed to establish the third requirement of standing, 
redressability.61 Since the forms were already filed, the only re-
maining judicial remedies available were civil penalties, payable 
to the United States Treasury, not CBE.62 CBE requested five 
forms of judicial relief, but the Supreme Court held “[n]one of the 
specific items of relief sought . . . would serve to reimburse [CBE] 
for losses caused by the late reporting, or to eliminate any effects 
of that late reporting upon [CBE].”63 
In Steel Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity that 
the judicial remedy cures the injury.64 A judicial remedy that has 
no remediating effect on the plaintiff’s alleged injury would fail to 
establish the redressability requirement.65 “In requesting [civil ju-
dicial penalties] . . . respondent seeks not remediation of its own 
injury—reimbursement for the costs it incurred as a result of the 
late filing—but vindication of the rule of law—the ‘undifferentiated 
public interest’ in faithful execution of EPCRA.”66 Although the re-
imbursement of attorney’s fees is available in the EPCRA citizen 
 
57. Id. at 104 (citations omitted). 
58. Id. at 105. 
59. Id. (“[A]ssuming injury in fact [because] the complaint fail[ed] the third 
test of standing, redressability.”). 
60. Id. at 88. 
61. Id. at 105, 109–10. 
62. Id. at 109 (“Because respondent allege[d] only past infractions of EPRCA, 
and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive 
relief [would not have] redress[ed] its injury.”). 
63. Id. at 105–06. 
64. Id. at 107. (“Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot boot-
strap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability 
requirement.”). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 106.  
11
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suit provision, “[a]n ‘interest in attorney’s fees is . . . insufficient to 
create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the 
merits of the underlying claim.’”67 
Additionally, the Supreme Court dismissed the notion that a 
“psychic satisfaction” with the faithful execution of the laws of the 
United States would suffice to establish redressability.68 A “gener-
alized interest in deterrence . . . is insufficient for purposes of Ar-
ticle III.”69 The essential inquiry is not whether plaintiffs believe 
their injury has been redressed, but whether the court determines 
the judicial remedy has more than just the effect of general deter-
rence.70 In the concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens dis-
agreed, stating “[h]istory supports the proposition that punish-
ment or deterrence can redress an injury . . . [g]iven this history, 
the Framers of Article III surely would have considered such pro-
ceedings to be ‘Cases’ that would ‘redress’ an injury even though 
the party bringing suit did not receive any monetary compensa-
tion.”71 
In 2000, the Supreme Court held civil penalties which served 
as a general deterrent to future violations sufficient to satisfy re-
dressability in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Ser-
vices.72 Laidlaw owned and operated a hazardous waste incinera-
tor in Roebuck, South Carolina.73 Laidlaw had a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit, but 
later violated the permit when it discharged an excess amount of 
mercury into the North Tyger River.74 Friends of the Earth 
 
67. Id. at 107 (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990)). 
68. Id. (“[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact 
that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just 
deserts, or that the nation’s laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction 
is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable 
Article III injury.”). 
69. Id. at 108–09. 
70. Id. at 127 (“[CBE] clearly believe[d] that the punishment of the Steel 
Company, along with future deterrence of the Steel Company and others, re-
dresses its injury, and there is no basis in our previous standing holdings to sug-
gest otherwise.”) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
71. Id. at 127–28 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
72. Friends of the Earth II, 528 U.S. at 174 (“[Civil] penalties may serve, as 
an alternative to an injunction, to deter future violations and thereby redress the 
injuries that prompted a citizen suitor to commence litigation.”). 
73. Id. at 175. 
74. Id. at 176. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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(“FOE”) represented several of its members who alleged injuries 
due to the excess discharges.75 FOE requested “declaratory and in-
junctive relief and an award of civil penalties.”76 However, the in-
cinerator facility in Roebuck was “permanently closed, dismantled, 
and put up for sale, and all discharges from the facility perma-
nently ceased” before the case reached the Supreme Court.77 Civil 
penalties were the only appropriate judicial remedies that re-
mained.78 The district court assessed a civil penalty of $405,800 on 
Laidlaw.79 
After a lengthy discussion analyzing whether there was an in-
jury in fact, the Supreme Court turned to redressability and dis-
tinguished the present case from Steel Co. In discussing whether 
civil penalties satisfy redressability, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured or 
faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing 
at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that con-
duct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress. 
Civil penalties can fit that description. To the extent that they 
encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and de-
ter them from committing future ones, they afford redress to cit-
izen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a 
consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct.80 
 
The Supreme Court found the substantial deterrent effect, 
which Congress intended when drafting the Clean Water Act, suf-
ficient to satisfy redressability.81 After civil penalties were as-
 
75. Id. at 181–83.  
76. Id. at 177. 
77. Id. at 179. 
78. Id. at 178 (“The court declined to grant FOE’s request for injunctive re-
lief, stating that an injunction was inappropriate because ‘Laidlaw [was] in sub-
stantial compliance with all parameters in its NPDES permit since at least Au-
gust 1992.’”).  
79. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 956 F. Supp. 588, 
612 (D.S.C. 1997) [hereinafter Friends of the Earth I]. 
80. Friends of the Earth II, 528 U.S. at 185–86. 
81. Id. at 185 (“Congress has found that civil penalties in Clean Water Act 
cases do more than promote immediate compliance by limiting the defendant’s 
economic incentive to delay its attainment of permit limits; they also deter future 
13
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sessed, Laidlaw ceased all operations, confirming the deterrent ef-
fect.82 The absence of ongoing violations in Friends of the Earth 
was the distinguishing factor between Friends of the Earth and 
Steel Co.83 Civil penalties are sufficient to establish redressability 
for ongoing violations, as the citizen suit provision is meant to rem-
edy present or future violations, not wholly past violations.84 
III. ESTABLISHING ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDING: FROM LUJAN TO JULIANA 
All three requirements were applied in conjunction by Justice 
Scalia in the infamous case, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.85 Lujan 
combined the common law requirements scattered throughout ear-
lier cases.86 Justice Scalia described the requirements of Article 
III: 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible 
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical[.]’” Second, there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
 
violations. This congressional determination warrants judicial attention and re-
spect. ‘The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress wanted the district 
court to consider the need for retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitu-
tion, when it imposed civil penalties[.]’”) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 422–23 (1987)). 
82. Id. at 187 (“[T]he civil penalties sought by FOE carried with them a de-
terrent effect that made it likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the pen-
alties would redress FOE’s injuries by abating current violations and preventing 
future ones—as the District Court reasonably found when it assessed a penalty 
of $405,800.”). 
83. Id. (“Steel Co. established that citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil 
penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit.”) (citing Steel Co., 
523 U.S. at 106–07).  
84. See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 
(1987) (“[T]he harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present 
or the future, not in the past.”). 
85. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
86. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983); Si-
mon, 426 U.S. at 37–42; Warth, 422 U.S. at 508; Morton, 405 U.S. at 740–41 n.16; 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be 
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will 
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”87 
 
In Lujan, the Supreme Court dismissed Defenders of Wildlife’s 
claim for failing to establish the first and third Article III standing 
requirements.88 Defenders of Wildlife, a group of wildlife conserva-
tion and environmental organizations, sought an injunction and 
declaratory judgment requiring the Secretary of Interior to prom-
ulgate a new rule reverting to the initial interpretation of section 
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act.89 The new interpretation 
required agency consultation for actions affecting endangered spe-
cies in the United States or on the high seas, whereas the initial 
interpretation required consultation for actions taken in the 
United States, on the high seas, and in foreign nations.90 Justice 
Scalia authored the majority opinion, finding the “novel” legal the-
ories of Defenders of Wildlife unpersuasive.91 
Justice Scalia found the affidavits submitted by Defenders of 
Wildlife insufficient to establish an “actual or imminent” injury in 
fact.92 The affidavits described the future intentions of its members 
to travel to two regions, Sri Lanka and Egypt, where the United 
States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) funding 
was supporting development projects which had the potential to 
 
87. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations omitted).  
88. See id. at 562–78 (discussing injury in fact and redressability).  
89. Id. at 557–58; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
90. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58. 
91. Id. at 565–66 (“The first, inelegantly styled ‘ecosystem nexus,’ proposes 
that any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected 
by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance 
away. . . . Respondents’ other theories are called, alas, the ‘animal nexus’ ap-
proach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered 
animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the ‘vocational nexus’ approach, 
under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue. Under 
these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and 
anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue 
because the Director of [USAID] did not consult with the Secretary regarding the 
[US]AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason. Standing is not 
‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,’ but as we have said requires, 
at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm.”) (citation 
omitted). 
92. Id. at 564. 
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affect endangered species.93 Justice Scalia noted that “some day” 
intentions to visit at an unspecified time in the future was not suf-
ficient to establish an “actual or imminent injury.”94 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia reasoned Defenders of Wildlife 
failed to establish the third standing requirement, redressability.95 
Typically, federal agencies provide only a small fraction of the total 
funding for development projects, therefore a ruling in favor of De-
fenders of Wildlife would not sufficiently redress their grievances 
about the potential injury to any endangered species.96 
Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
dissented, finding the decision amounted to “a slash-and-burn ex-
pedition through the law of environmental standing.”97 Both affi-
davits submitted were found insufficient to establish an injury in 
fact because they did not have a “description of concrete” plans to 
return to the affected areas.98 The dissent argued “a reasonable 
finder of fact could conclude from the information in the affidavits 
and deposition testimony that either [member] will soon return to 
the project sites, thereby satisfying the ‘actual or imminent’ injury 
standard.”99 The professional interest of both members was not 
disputed, but rather the imminence of their injuries.100 The simple 
 
93. Id. at 563–64.  
94. Id. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of con-
crete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not 
support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
95. Id. at 562–71.  
96. Id. at 571 (“A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the 
agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project. 
[US]AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli 
[Sri Lanka] project. Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the pro-
jects they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species, 
if that fraction is eliminated.”). 
97. Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 564. 
99. Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“But those statements did not 
stand alone. A reasonable finder of fact could conclude, based not only upon their 
statements of intent to return, but upon their past visits to the project sites, as 
well as their professional backgrounds, that it was likely that Kelly and Skilbred 
would make a return trip to the project areas. Contrary to the Court’s contention 
that Kelly’s and Skilbred’s past visits ‘prove nothing,’ the fact of their past visits 
could demonstrate to a reasonable factfinder that Kelly and Skilbred have the 
requisite resources and personal interest in the preservation of the species endan-
gered by the Aswan and Mahaweli projects to make good on their intention to 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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purchase of a plane ticket would have satisfied this require-
ment.101 This “empty formality” rendered the first requirement, in-
jury in fact, unfulfilled.102 Contrary to prior cases in which the im-
minence of an injury hinged upon the actions of some third party, 
the injury could become imminent with the purchase of a ticket by 
a party to the case.103 
The dissent was unconvinced by the majority’s theory that 
since neither the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) or USAID 
were parties to the lawsuit, “there [wa]s no reason they should be 
obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit pro-
duced.”104 Although the agencies provided only a fraction of the 
funding, that fraction was $170 million.105 That is “not so paltry a 
sum for a country of only 16 million people with a gross national 
product of less than $6 billion in 1986.”106 Defenders of Wildlife 
sought to compel consultation for actions in foreign nations affect-
ing endangered species, not a revocation of funding.107 According 
to the dissent, a genuine issue of material fact was raised with re-
gards to redressability.108 
The outcome of Lujan demonstrates the heavy, nuanced bur-
den that environmental plaintiffs face in establishing standing; 
 
return again. Similarly, Kelly’s and Skilbred’s professional backgrounds in wild-
life preservation, also make it likely—at least far more likely than for the average 
citizen—that they would choose to visit these areas of the world where species are 
vanishing.”) (citations omitted). 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 592. 
103. Id. at 593 (“To be sure, a plaintiff’s unilateral control over his or her 
exposure to harm does not necessarily render the harm nonspeculative. Never-
theless, it suggests that a finder of fact would be far more likely to conclude the 
harm is actual or imminent, especially if given an opportunity to hear testimony 
and determine credibility.”).  
104. Id. at 569. 
105. Id. at 599. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
107. Id. at 559 (“[Defenders of Wildlife] filed this action against the Secretary 
of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is in error 
as to the geographic scope of § 7(a)(2) and an injunction requiring the Secretary 
to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation.”).  
108. Id. at 589 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For two recent contrasting cases 
discussing redressability, see generally WildEarth Guardians v. USDA, 795 F.3d 
1148, 1156 (2015) (applying a relaxed redressability requirement because the case 
involved a procedural right); Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (2013) 
(holding plaintiffs failed to establish redressability because the requested pollu-
tion controls would not likely reduce the injury causing pollution). 
17
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however, recent case law exemplifies a trend towards relaxing 
these barriers. As previously mentioned, in Friends of the Earth, 
the Supreme Court applied the Lujan test and held standing was 
established.109 The Court used several affidavits from FOE mem-
bers in finding an injury in fact.110 The affidavits demonstrated a 
clear injury, and could therefore not “be equated with the specula-
tive ‘some day intentions’ to visit endangered species halfway 
around the world that we held insufficient to show injury in fact in 
[Lujan v.] Defenders of Wildlife.”111 According to the majority, 
whether there is an injury to the environment is not the proper 
inquiry, but rather, whether there is an injury to one of the human 
plaintiffs.112 Thus, based on the affidavits, the Court held FOE suf-
fered an injury in fact.113 
The facts in Friends of the Earth are not entirely distinguish-
able from Lujan, in which the Court reached the opposite conclu-
sion and dismissed the case due to a lack of standing.114 In Friends 
of the Earth, Kenneth Lee Curtis submitted an affidavit on behalf 
of FOE.115 Mr. Curtis lived downstream from the North Tyger 
River and expressed a desire to “fish camp, swim, and picnic in and 
near the river between 3 and 15 miles downstream from the 
[Laidlaw] facility[.]”116 Mr. Curtis did not specify any dates in 
which he planned to fish, camp, or swim in the North Tyger River, 
yet the Supreme Court held his injury in fact was pled with suffi-
cient detail.117 
 
109. Friends of the Earth II, 528 U.S. at 181–82. 
110. Id. at 184 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 181 (“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, 
however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff. To insist upon 
the former rather than the latter as part of the standing inquiry (as the dissent 
in essence does, post, at 2-3) is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the nec-
essary showing for success on the merits in an action alleging noncompliance with 
an NPDES permit. Focusing properly on injury to the plaintiff, the District Court 
found that FOE had demonstrated sufficient injury to establish standing.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
113. Id. at 198–214 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lujan was not 
properly applied).  
114. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–71. 
115. Friends of the Earth II, 528 U.S. at 181–82. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 182. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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The doctrine of standing expands and contracts without any 
discernible pattern. In 2009, the Supreme Court did not find stand-
ing in Summers v. Earth Island Institute118 after Earth Island In-
stitute, a group of environmental organizations, failed to show how 
regulations promulgated by the U.S. Forest Service exempting 
small fire remediation projects from environmental impact state-
ments and environmental assessments would affect its mem-
bers.119 Standing was established for the Burnt Ridge remediation 
project, as Earth Island submitted affidavits exhibiting a members’ 
interest in the area.120 However, the Supreme Court found Earth 
Island lacked standing to challenge the regulation on its face, stat-
ing “respondents can demonstrate standing only if application of 
the regulations by the Government will affect them.”121 However, 
“[t]he regulations under challenge here neither require nor forbid 
any action on the part of [Earth Island].”122 
Earth Island submitted various affidavits to show its members 
concrete interests in the Burnt Ridge Forest, which the Court 
found sufficient to establish standing.123 However, the affidavit of 
Jim Bensman was determined to be insufficient because “he had 
[only] suffered injury in the past from development on Forest Ser-
vice land.”124 The affidavit indicating a future intention to visit the 
 
118. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
119. Id. at 490–91 (“[A]mendments to the Forest Service’s manual of imple-
menting procedures, adopted by rule after notice and comment, provided that fire-
rehabilitation activities on areas of less than 4,200 acres, and salvage-timber 
sales of 250 acres or less, did not cause a significant environmental impact and 
thus would be categorically exempt from the requirement to file an EIS or EA.”); 
see also National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Man-
agement Activities; Categorial Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,824 (June 5, 2003).  
120.  Summers, 555 U.S. at 494 (“Affidavits submitted to the District Court 
alleged that organization member Ara Marderosian had repeatedly visited the 
Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to do so again, and that his interests 
in viewing the flora and fauna of the area would be harmed if the Burnt Ridge 
Project went forward without incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested 
if the Forest Service had provided him an opportunity to comment. The Govern-
ment concedes this was sufficient to establish Article III standing with respect to 
Burnt Ridge.”). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 493. 
123. Id. at 494. 
124. Id. at 495. 
19
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Allegheny National Forest (an area subject to the regulations at 
issue) was not sufficiently specific nor imminent.125 
The Supreme Court articulated an exception to the doctrine of 
standing in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.126 
The Supreme Court held Massachusetts, as a sovereign state, 
should be given “special solicitude”127 in the Article III standing 
determination. Massachusetts was amongst a group of states,128 
local governments,129 and private organizations130 requesting the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulate the release of 
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).131 Massa-
chusetts argued it would lose valuable coastal lands as a result of 
sea level rise from increased CO2 emissions.132 
According to the Supreme Court, the sovereign status of Mas-
sachusetts entitled it to “special solicitude” in the Article III stand-
ing determination.133 As such, the Court found Massachusetts es-
tablished standing under an exception to the normal three 
 
125. Id. at 495–96 (“The Bensman affidavit does refer specifically to a series 
of projects in the Allegheny National Forest that are subject to the challenged 
regulations. It does not assert, however, any firm intention to visit their locations, 
saying only that Bensman ‘want[s] to’ go there. . . . This vague desire to return is 
insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury[.]”) (citation omitted). 
126. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (holding 
that Massachusetts, as a sovereign state, should be given “special solicitude,” and 
therefore EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases poses a risk of harm that is 
both actual and imminent).  
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 505 n.2 (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wash-
ington). 
129. Id. at 505 n.3 (District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, 
and Baltimore). 
130. Id. at 505 n.4 (Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, 
Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental De-
fense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology As-
sessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Si-
erra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U. S. Public Interest Research 
Group). 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2018). The Clean Air Act requires EPA “to pro-
tect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the 
public health and welfare.” Id. 
132. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522–23. 
133. Id. at 520. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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requirements.134 Since Congress statutorily authorized135 a chal-
lenge to EPA action of this sort, the immediacy and redressability 
of the injury need not be fully satisfied.136 The Court reasoned that 
an injury in fact was established because Massachusetts projected 
increased greenhouse gas emissions would exacerbate the problem 
of global warming resulting in a loss of coastal lands for Massachu-
setts.137 
Contrary to prior cases, the Supreme Court found the potential 
injury to Massachusetts (i.e., the future loss of valuable coastal 
land) a sufficient injury in fact.138 The Supreme Court did note that 
Massachusetts had already suffered some coastal land loss, but the 
focus was on the potential for future, catastrophic loss.139 This 
analysis is not reconcilable with prior cases in which the Court dis-
missed cases that attempted to establish standing with future or 
potential environmental injuries. For example, in Lujan, the Su-
preme Court dismissed the case because the “some day intentions” 
(i.e., potential intentions) of Defenders of Wildlife members were 
insufficient to satisfy an injury in fact.140 However, in Massachu-
 
134. Id. at 498. 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
136. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517–18 (“[A] litigant to whom Congress has 
‘accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,’—here, the right to 
challenge agency action unlawfully withheld,—’can assert that right without 
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy[.]’ When a lit-
igant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some 
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to recon-
sider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”) (citations omitted). 
137. Id. at 519 (“That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 
‘territory alleged to be affected’ only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the 
outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal ju-
dicial power.”). 
138. Id. at 522–23 (“[G]lobal sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 
centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming. These rising seas 
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. . . . The severity of 
that injury will only increase over the course of the next century: If sea levels 
continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant 
fraction of coastal property will be ‘either permanently lost through inundation or 
temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
139. Id. at 526 (“[T]he rise in sea levels associated with global warming has 
already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of cata-
strophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.”). 
140. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (citation omitted). 
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setts, the Court held the opposite, citing extensive research on cli-
mate change to support Massachusetts’s contention that it would 
lose valuable coastal land.141 
Due to the unique factual situation of Massachusetts, the prec-
edential value it offers environmental organizations and private 
citizens is unclear. Additionally, the “special solicitude” granted to 
Massachusetts continues to be questioned.142 While sovereign 
states may be granted “special solicitude” in a standing analysis, 
the citizens of those states, who will feel the same consequences as 
the sovereign states, may not receive the same preferential treat-
ment. This exception carved out by the Supreme Court for sover-
eign states exemplifies that the Court might be willing to bend the 
judge-made requirements of standing to address climate change. 
Juliana v. United States has the potential to further expand 
the federal interpretation of standing.143 The plaintiffs, twenty-one 
minors, alleged injury as a result of the federal government’s de-
liberate allowance of pollution and climate change on a “cata-
strophic level.”144 The plaintiffs brought an action for injunctive 
and declaratory relief against the President, the United States, 
and various executive agencies.145 Plaintiffs allege greenhouse gas 
emissions, produced by burning fossil fuels, have destabilized the 
climate system and resulted in violations of their substantive due 
process rights and defendants’ obligation to hold natural resources 
in the public trust.146 Specifically, plaintiffs “seek (1) a declaration 
[stating] their constitutional and public trust rights have been vi-
olated and (2) an order enjoining defendants from violating those 
rights and directing defendants to develop a plan to reduce [CO2] 
emissions.”147 
 
141. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 507–10, 521–23 (discussing scientific reports 
which model the impacts of climate change). 
142. Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 113232, at *31–33 (E.D. Okla. 2013) (questioning the “special solici-
tude” status given to Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA, emphasizing that 
a concrete injury is necessary to establish standing). 
143. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). 
144. Id. at 1250. 
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On defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court of Oregon 
held (a) a non-justiciable political question was not raised;148 (b) 
the constitutional question of standing was satisfied;149 (c) “the 
right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fun-
damental to a free and ordered society[;]”150 (d) plaintiffs suffi-
ciently stated a substantive due process violation based on a dan-
ger creation theory;151 (e) plaintiffs adequately alleged harm to 
public trust assets;152 (f) the public trust doctrine can apply to the 
federal government;153 and (g) plaintiffs had a right of action to 
enforce the public trust doctrine.154 Not only has the District Court 
of Oregon stretched the doctrine of standing further than ever be-
fore, but it indicated a willingness to grant the requested injunc-
tive relief: the establishment of a nationwide plan to reduce CO2 
emissions.155 
The decision in Juliana radically relaxed the constitutional 
barriers to establish standing for climate change related injuries. 
The District of Oregon held standing was properly established be-
cause “plaintiffs alleged injuries—harm to their personal, eco-
nomic and aesthetic interests—are concrete and particularized, 
not abstract or indefinite.”156 The injuries alleged by the plaintiffs, 
that the government failed to properly address runaway green-
house gas emissions, is one of the primary causes of climate 
change.157 
 
148. Id. at 1241–42. 
149. Id. at 1242–48. 
150. Id. at 1250. 
151. Id. at 1250–52. 
152. Id. at 1252–55. 
153. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–59. 
154. Id. at 1261. 
155. Id. at 1247 (“The declaratory and injunctive relief plaintiffs request 
meets this standard. Most notably, plaintiffs ask this Court to ‘[o]rder Defendants 
to prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fos-
sil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2[.]’ If plaintiffs can 
show, as they have alleged, that defendants have control over a quarter of the 
planet’s greenhouse gas emissions, and that a reduction in those emissions would 
reduce atmospheric CO2 and slow climate change, then plaintiffs’ requested relief 
would redress their injuries.”) (citation omitted). 
156. Id. at 1244.  
157. Id. at 1245–46. 
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Judge Ann Aiken of the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon authored the groundbreaking decision in Juli-
ana. In her decision, Judge Aiken laments at what she sees as a 
failing of the judicial system: the ability to redress environmental 
issues.158 Juliana espouses novel legal theories which have the 
power to transform the way courts across the country address cli-
mate change injuries. The case was expected to proceed to trial in 
late 2018 but has been delayed several times.159 Yet, Judge Aiken’s 
decision could serve as valuable precedent or persuasion for cli-
mate change litigation to come. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING AROUND THE 
WORLD 
Other countries are not restricted by the requirements of Ar-
ticle III standing, so many countries have relaxed standing re-
quirements. Some countries have even gone so far as to create spe-
cial environmental courts, with procedural rules tailored to 
efficiently adjudicate environmental disputes.160 Countries with 
more relaxed standing requirements for climate change injuries 
have done so effectively, without destroying their judicial sys-
tems.161 The United States would be wise to take tested methods 
in other countries to develop its own approach to climate change 
cases.162 
 
158. Id. at 1262 (“Federal courts too often have been cautious and overly def-
erential in the arena of environmental law, and the world has suffered for it.”). 
159. See generally Benjamin Hulac, Climate Trial Halted as Trump Admin 
Seeks to Bar Witnesses, CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/EQ86-
5NYU; Keith Goldberg, 9th Circ. Won’t Shut Down Kids’ Climate Suit Against 
Feds, LAW 360 (Mar. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/F82P-DPJ5; Chelsea Harvey, A 
Landmark Climate Lawsuit Against Trump is Scheduled for Trial Next Year. 
Here’s What To Expect., WASH. POST (July 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/LX5J-W9DK. 
160. CATHERINE PRING & GEORGE PRING, GREENING JUSTICE: CREATING AND 
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 3–6 (2009), 
https://perma.cc/YB2H-U45Y (discussing methodology to study environmental 
courts in twenty-four countries).  
161. Id. at 11 (“A number of prominent [environmental court] models have 
paved the way and provided successful examples for other nations. Environmen-
tal justice advocates have been persuasive that specialized [environmental courts] 
can be an efficient and effective way of achieving environmental goals.”). 
162. The United States considered establishing an environmental court in 
the 1970s. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
  
2019] Establishing Climate Change Standing 321 
Some of the most liberal standing requirements are utilized in 
India. Citizens can file environmental cases directly in the Su-
preme Court, even for minor or localized grievances.163 Starting in 
the 1970s, Justice Bhagwati relaxed the barriers to standing, per-
mitting publicly minded citizens to fight for causes on behalf of the 
poor and oppressed.164 
Additionally, the Philippines proposed the “Draft Rule of Pro-
cedure for Environmental Cases,” expressly granting future gener-
ations standing to sue for environmental degradation.165 The draft 
rule was a result of Oposa v. Factoran,166 in which well-known en-
vironmental attorney Tony Oposa won a lawsuit “on behalf of his 
own children’s and future generations’ rights to enjoy forests and 
a healthy environment.”167 In Oposa, the petitioners, a group of 
minors represented by their parents, claimed the resulting defor-
estation from the issuance of timber license agreements from the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources damaged the 
environment and violated their constitutional right to a balanced 
and healthful environment.168 
South Africa has a liberal standing requirement, similar to the 
one drafted in the Philippines: 
 
 
§ 9, 86 Stat. 899 (1972) (“[T]he President, . . . shall make a full and complete in-
vestigation and study of the feasibility of establishing a separate court or court 
system, having jurisdiction over environmental matters[.]”). 
163. PRING & PRING, supra note 160, at 38.  
164. Id.  
165. Draft Rule of Procedure for Environmental Cases, Rule 2, § 5, A.M. No. 
09-6-8-SC (S.C., April 13, 2010) (Phil.), https://perma.cc/V2GB-6X8S (“Any person 
or group of persons, by themselves or through duly-authorized representatives, or 
in representation of others, including generations yet unborn, in a class suit, may 
file a civil action involving a violation or enforcement of environmental laws and 
shall include: (a) Any citizen; (b) Minors with the assistance of their parents or 
guardians; (c) People’s and non-governmental organizations and public interest 
groups; (d) Indigenous peoples and local communities; (e) Others similarly situ-
ated.”) (emphasis added). 
166. See generally Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 
(July 30, 1993) (Phil.). 
167. PRING & PRING, supra note 160, at 34. 
168. CONST. (1987) art. II, §§ 15–16 (Phil.) (The Constitution of the Philip-
pines contains the following clauses: “Section 15. The State shall protect and pro-
mote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among 
them. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a 
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of na-
ture.”); Oposa, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.). 
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Legal standing to enforce environmental laws. – (1) Any person 
or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any 
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, includ-
ing a principle contained in Chapter 1, or any other statutory 
provision concerned with the protection of the environment or 
the use of natural resources – (a) in that person’s or group of 
person’s own interest; (b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a 
person who is, for practical reasons, unable to institute such pro-
ceedings; (c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of 
persons whose interests are affected; (d) in the public interest; 
and (e) in the interest of protecting the environment.169 
 
Additionally, many other countries have liberal standing re-
quirements through the application of an ancient Roman principle 
known as actio popularis.170 Countries that follow this principle 
typically will allow “any person” to sue the government for its fail-
ure to uphold the law.171 Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Estonia, 
and Slovenia are a few of the countries that apply versions of this 
principle.172 
The above examples from around the world exemplify the ju-
dicial trend towards relaxing barriers to adjudicate climate change 
injuries. The modification of the American doctrine of standing is 
not a farfetched academic idea, but is based on workable doctrines 
in use in other countries. There are many other factors which make 
the circumstances in the United States different from other coun-
tries, but that does not mean the United States cannot learn from 
other countries to increase the effectiveness of the judicial system 




169. South Africa National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 32 
(S. Afr.). 
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V. THE WANING IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDGE-
MADE REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH 
STANDING 
A. Standing is a Reflection of the Political Inclination 
of Judges 
Determining the three requirements of Article III’s standing 
test is not straightforward or simple. Rather, it can be easily 
warped to a judge’s liking, having a dramatic effect on which envi-
ronmental cases are decided on the merits.173 The inconsistent ap-
plication of standing to environmental cases has been received 
harshly by many in the legal community.174 Injury in fact is a nor-
mative analysis, resulting in illogical and inconsistent rulings.175 
 
173. William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 
65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 286–87 (2013) (“The environmental [standing] cases also re-
spond to the Court’s perception of political reality . . . [the Supreme Court] is nar-
rowly construing statutes with whose policies it disagrees, using a standing doc-
trine that it has developed for this purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
174. Id. at 279 (The Court has been unable to provide satisfactory explana-
tions for many of its standing decisions. “Justice Harlan complained in 1968 that 
standing is a ‘word game played by secret rules.’ Justice Harlan’s complaint was, 
and continues to be, entirely justified if the Court’s decisions are explained in the 
terms provided by its doctrine. Academic criticism has been even more harsh. 
Words such as ‘manipulation,’ ‘dishonesty,’ and ‘hypocrisy’ are not uncommon.”). 
175. Id. at 280 (“‘Injury in fact’ may appear to be a neutral factual concept. 
But it is not. It is a normative concept. If we put people who lie to one side, it is 
apparent that anyone who feels himself or herself to be injured is, in fact, injured. 
We may not ourselves feel injured in the same situation. We may not choose to 
recognize someone’s injury as entitling that person to protection or compensation. 
But our refusal to recognize or provide a remedy is based on a normative rather 
than a factual judgment.”). 
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An injury to one person may not be viewed as an injury to an-
other.176 Standing, as a normative analysis, is applied inconsist-
ently177 and is often decided based on implicit or explicit judicial 
biases.178 
In the case in which the term “injury in fact” originated, it used 
a hypothetical or conjectural injury (i.e., future losses) as the basis 
to find standing had been established.179 Thus, the injury in fact 
requirement was not created to be an obstacle, but a clarifying 
 
176. Id. 
177. See Me. People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt., Inc, 471 F.3d 277, 284 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (“[A]n individual’s decision to deny herself aesthetic or recreational 
pleasures based on concern about pollution will constitute a cognizable injury only 
when the concern is premised upon a realistic threat.”); Baur v. Veneman, 352 
F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because the evaluation of risk is qualitative, the 
probability of harm which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a cog-
nizable injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the probable harm.”); 
Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“[A]n individual can establish ‘injury in fact’ by showing a connection to 
the area of concern sufficient to make credible the contention that the person’s 
future life will be less enjoyable—that he or she really has or will suffer in his or 
her degree of aesthetic or recreational satisfaction—if the area in question re-
mains or becomes environmentally degraded.”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gas-
ton Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156–60 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (hold-
ing injury in fact satisfied since the plaintiff “is a property owner whose lake lies 
in the path of Gaston Copper’s toxic chemical discharge. He and his family swim 
and fish in this lake [and] he and his family swim less in and eat less fish from 
the lake because of his fears of pollution[.]”); see also Glenn D. Grant, Standing 
Standing on Shaky Ground, 57 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 1408, 1408 (1989) (“Unques-
tionably, standing has become one of the most important and controversial issues 
to confront the D.C. Circuit in recent years. In its most recent standing cases, the 
D.C. Circuit has divided along ideological grounds, with the more recently ap-
pointed judges taking a narrower and more conservative view of the standing doc-
trine[.]”); see supra Parts II–III. 
178. See generally Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-
Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 727–29 (2009) (discussing the 
theory of “identifiability bias” in which the standing doctrine “favors [] suits that 
address harms to specific individuals, but disfavors suits where the victims are 
less specifically identifiable such as victims of broad diffuse environmental prob-
lems, including future generations.”); Sam Kalen, Standing on Its Last Legs: Ben-
nett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 13 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 29 (1997) (“Justice Scalia’s analysis reflects a decided 
bias towards only conferring standing upon those persons asserting easily percep-
tible harm that occurs when one lives near or actually uses an allegedly affected 
area. This bias is further evidenced by his dismissal of the three nexus theories 
proposed by [Defenders of Wildlife in Lujan].”). 
179. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152. 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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standard,180 until the decision in Lujan.181 The requirement is 
judge-made law with no basis in the Constitution and can be elim-
inated or modified just as easily as it was created.182 Moreover, the 
focus on a “concrete and particularized”183 injury is illogical and 
has no constitutional origin. 
As the dissent noted in Lujan, the purchase of a plane ticket 
by one of the members would have satisfied that requirement.184 
This subtle distinction is trivial. Similarly, in Summers, if the 
Bensman affidavit merely gave a specific date in which he intended 
to travel to the Allegheny National Forest, the Supreme Court 
would have been more likely to find that standing had been estab-
lished.185 These trivial and minute details do not accurately delin-
eate a case or controversy from a non-justiciable claim, but merely 
require a substantive level of specificity to overcome a preliminary 
procedural hurdle which causes claims with merit to be dismissed. 
B. The Impact of Juliana 
Juliana v. United States broke open the boundaries that 
seemed to be in place to establish standing under Article III. Juli-
ana has several potential impacts on the future of climate change 
litigation. There have been numerous cases filed since making sim-
ilar arguments.186 First, standing may become a minor hurdle in 
 
180. Id. at 154–55 (discussing a trend to enlarge the class of people able to 
establish standing). 
181. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–71. 
182. See Barnum, supra note 21, at 7–25. 
183. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see generally Christopher L. Muehlberger, One 
Man’s Conjecture Is Another Man’s Concrete: Applying the “Injury-in-Fact” Stand-
ing Requirement to Global Warming, 76 UMKC L. REV. 177, 195 (2007) (“Assum-
ing that the courts (and defendants) are able to redress global warming injuries 
through their decision, it should be sufficient if the plaintiffs simply have to assert 
an injury that is real (concrete) and affects them in a distinct and personal way 
(particularity).”). 
184. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (“By requiring a ‘description of concrete plans’ or 
‘specification of when the some day [for a return visit] will be,’ . . . in my view, 
demands what is likely an empty formality. No substantial barriers prevent Kelly 
or Skilbred from simply purchasing plane tickets to return to the Aswan and Ma-
haweli projects.”). 
185. Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. 
186. See Clean Air Council v. United States, — F. Supp. 3d ——, No. CV 17-
4977, 2019 WL 687873, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2019) (holding plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring a public trust action against the federal government for the roll-
back of environmental regulations).  
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which all climate change related injuries, regardless of scale or sig-
nificance, can overcome because of the consensus that further ju-
dicial remedies are necessary. Second, it may highlight the anti-
quated nature of the Article III test largely created by the Supreme 
Court in the 1970s. A new test may emerge, one specific for climate 
change litigation which enables climate change cases to be stream-
lined. Third, the opinion by Judge Aiken demonstrated judges are 
willing to address climate change in the judicial system. With no 
federal legislation to address climate change, environmentally in-
clined judges may see an opening to address these issues. 
C. Streamlining Standing for Climate Change Cases 
As the scientific consensus regarding the drastic human influ-
ence on the global ecosystem increases, the American judicial sys-
tem should view parts of the Article III requirements as inherently 
satisfied because of the ubiquitous nature of the consequences of 
climate change. Courts should aim to streamline cases that allege 
scientifically supportable climate change injuries to a substantive 
level of the case. 
Just as the Supreme Court articulated an exception for stand-
ing for a sovereign state in Massachusetts v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, an exception should be established for climate 
change related injuries.187 With no federal legislation addressing 
climate change, the judicial system is one of the few areas in which 
injured citizens can find and pursue remedies. 
A specialized test, which assumes injury in fact and causation, 
will greatly reduce the burden on plaintiffs. This will streamline a 
specific class of climate change cases, which will be determined by 
judges, to substantive levels of motion practice and/or trial. There 
should be no artificially high procedural burden on environmental 
plaintiffs to establish scientifically accepted principals of injury 
and causation. 
Redressability can remain nearly the same; however, the bar 
to establish it should be lowered.188 It should be sufficient for the 
 
187. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520. 
188. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies a relaxed causation and re-
dressability requirement when a procedural right is involved. A similar exception 
should be carved out for climate change cases. “Once plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
a procedural requirement establish a concrete injury, ‘the causation and redress-
ability requirements are relaxed.’” WildEarth Guardians v. USDA, 795 F.3d 1148, 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/4
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remedy to redress the injury even slightly. This is crucial to ad-
dress climate change because every little change furthers progress 
towards warding off the most dangerous consequences. If the atti-
tude were taken that only a complete remedy, one that would en-
tirely reverse the effects of climate change was sufficient to estab-
lish redressability, it would be impossible to establish standing. 
Further, focusing the analysis on redressability is a strategy fo-
cused on solutions, and a litany of solutions are needed in all areas 
impacted by climate change. 
The idea that a litigant must have a personal stake in the lit-
igation is inherently satisfied in climate change cases. As the pub-
lic becomes increasingly aware of the effects of climate change, it 
will be accepted that actions which degrade the environment have 
an indirect impact on everybody in the world, including future gen-
erations. The concept “NIMBY,” meaning “not in my backyard,”189 
will turn into “not on my planet,” and litigants, regardless of a “per-
sonal stake” in a case, will vigorously fight to seek redress and pre-
vent the most detrimental consequences of climate change. Cli-
mate change affects the entire world population, and it is unjust 
for litigants to be required to plead precise injuries just to enter 
the courtroom. If the American judicial system were to continue 
barring legitimate climate change cases from reaching a substan-





1154–56 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 
F.3d 472, 485 (9th Cir. 2011)). “This [relaxed redressability] requirement is satis-
fied when ‘the relief requested—that the agency follow the correct procedures—
may influence the agency’s ultimate decision.’” WildEarth Guardians, 795 F.3d at 
1156 (quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 
1226 (9th Cir. 2008)). See also Salmon Spawning, 545 F.3d at 1229 (holding that 
causation is satisfied under the relaxed requirements for procedural claims when 
“[t]he asserted injury is not too tenuously connected to the agencies’ failure” to 
take action). 
189. Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs: Generating Conflict, 
Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 427 (2010) (“The term 
NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) is generally used pejoratively to refer to people who 
fight against the siting of public utilities, commercial enterprises, or new residen-
tial developments which may negatively affect nearby property values, local aes-
thetics, or the environment, but which might provide benefits to the larger com-
munity.”). 
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D. The Judicial System is Not the Best, But One of the 
Few Mechanisms to Address Climate Change 
Climate change is a highly complex, diffuse, and opaque global 
issue. It lacks nearly all the typical characteristics of a legal case, 
including a clear injury by one side against another, the solution of 
which may involve a monetary penalty. However, due to the ab-
sence of any federal legislation addressing climate change, the ju-
dicial system is one of the few arenas where climate change can be 
addressed. A new, streamlined approach for standing would alle-
viate many of the hurdles faced by environmental litigants. 
If a standard such as this were implemented, it may spur leg-
islative action to prevent a flood of litigation. Environmentally in-
clined state legislatures may act on this momentum and imple-
ment climate change legislation. There may be pushback in states 
that are not environmentally inclined, and legislation may be 
passed to prevent the application of this form of climate change 
standing. However, even if climate change cases are restricted by 
legislation, it will put climate change on the forefront of political 
issues and hopefully bring light to the inadequacies of the judicial 
system in this area. 
If this change were to occur, there is the possibility that the 
“floodgates of litigation” would be opened. Across the country, liti-
gants would flood the judicial system with climate change cases, 
alleging injuries due to things such as increased storm intensity 
and reduced air quality. However, the potential for more litigation 
should not be a decisive factor. If litigants have a constitutional 
right to be heard and their injuries redressed by a court, which 
climate change litigants do, the potential for an increased workload 
should be irrelevant. 
The new, streamlined approach to climate change standing 
may appear overly burdensome to certain defendants who are 
likely to be named most often. The oil, natural gas, and coal indus-
tries, for example, may frequently be named as big contributors to 
climate change because of their large environmental impacts.190 
This litigation may put pressure on these industries and others in 
a similar position to lobby for federal climate litigation. These in-
dustries may be subjected to multiple lawsuits in multiple states, 
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leading to different outcomes and different penalties. Similar to 
the birth of the CAA in which the automotive industry called for 
uniform federal regulation of vehicle emissions,191 industry may 
lobby Congress for uniform federal climate legislation because it is 
a better alternative to consistently being dragged into court. It is 
almost an inevitable consequence, one that will be welcomed by 
environmentalists and industry alike. 
The streamlined approach suggested would not completely 
discard the requirements of Article III. Rather, it calls for an ex-
ception to the judge-made requirements for an issue of paramount 
importance. Each climate change litigant would be required to 
plead with sufficiency all the elements, but increased deference 
would be afforded and, as mentioned earlier, injury in fact and cau-
sation would be assumed for the accepted and known effects of cli-
mate change. The goal of the streamlined approach is not to flood 
the courts with meritless litigation, but to use the American judi-
cial system to redress public wrongs which have historically been 
difficult to address. The new, streamlined approach would have no 
bearing on other types of cases, only those that deal with climate 
change and specifically refer to such injuries as climate change re-
lated. 
Although there are effective remedies available for many cli-
mate change related injuries through tort law, those are primarily 
retrospective. What this Note proposes would be both retrospective 
and prospective—permitting litigants to use injunctive and mone-
tary relief to reduce and/or prevent the effects of climate change. 
The use of tort law, or other common law remedies, can and should 
remain an effective judicial remedy for various environmental in-
juries. However, standing remains an impediment for injuries that 
are more diffuse and opaque than traditional tort injuries, there-
fore a streamlined approach to standing will increase the ability of 
the courts to address climate change related injuries. 
 
191. Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization 
of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 330 (1985) (“Unlike most other 
industries, the automobile industry has strong reasons to prefer national legisla-
tion over state and local regulation of air pollution.”). 
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E. Standing Remains a Necessary Doctrine 
Although this Note advocates for a streamlined approach to 
establish standing for climate change cases, the doctrine of stand-
ing, or one like it, remains necessary in the American judicial sys-
tem. Cases before the court system must remain restricted to 
“cases” or “controversies” as prescribed in the Constitution.192 
It is imperative that the American judicial system is not bur-
dened with meritless cases. The justification for the doctrine of 
standing is logical, but mainly for the types of cases common 
throughout history with one discernible injury by one party against 
another. Climate change cases pose an entirely new problem that 
disregards the simple dichotomy of the past. With this small mod-
ification to the three requirements of standing, litigants across the 
country will have access to justice unlike ever before. At the same 
time, the integrity of the courts, bolstered by the case or contro-
versy requirement, will remain intact. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional doctrine of standing established in Article 
III is a necessary and effective means to preserve judicial re-
sources. The justifications for its inclusion in the American judicial 
system are well founded. However, its current application to envi-
ronmental cases, particularly climate change cases, is disastrous. 
Litigants with legitimate and deserving claims are unable to es-
tablish the strict requirements of standing because of the nature 
of injuries caused by climate change. A new, streamlined approach 
is needed. Streamlining climate change cases by assuming injury 
in fact and causation for a specific class of climate change injuries 
will enable courts to focus on solutions—solutions that are desper-
ately needed throughout the country. Without any federal climate 
legislation, the American public has few options to redress climate 
change. With a minor tweak to the current, judge-made require-
ments to establish standing, the American judicial system can be-
come an effective platform to reduce the negative impacts of cli-
mate change. 
The new, streamlined approach will begin to effectively ad-
dress climate change in the American judicial system in a manner 
 
192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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that is currently unattainable. Assuming injury in fact and causa-
tion for a specific class of climate change injuries will drastically 
improve the ability of the judicial system to redress climate change 
injuries. Streamlining climate change cases will increase the po-
tential for quick solutions to address rapidly worsening situations. 
The new standards may lead to the creation of federal climate leg-
islation, negating the need for streamlined standing, but in either 
scenario, the result will be the same—Americans will see concrete 
actions taken to address climate change. 
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